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STUDENT NOTES
SOME FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DISTINGUISHING
PREPARATION FROM THE OVERT ACT IN
CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS
An attempt to commit a crime is made up of three elements:
-(1) the specific intent to commit a crime, (2) an overt act amountang to more than mere preparation, and (3) failure to consummate
-the crime. The question to be discussed here is what are some of
the factors to be taken into consideration in determining what acts
on the part of one accused of a criminal attempt can be said to
be overt acts which are sufficient to sustain a conviction. Whether
the acts of any particular defendant constitute an attempt is to
a large extent a question of degree. He must have carried his plan
far enough so that it can be said that he has not merely been preparing to commit the crime, but that he has done some act or
acts toward the actual commission of the crine.' Since the dividing line between preparation and the attempt itself has never been
definitely located, the courts have resorted to the application of broad
principles to the facts in each individual case. This has led to much
confusion in borderline cases, different courts reaching different results
under similar facts. A study of borderline cases shows that factors
other than the extent of the act itself are often taken into consideration in determining whether an attempt has been committed or not.
For example, the nature of the crime which the defendant has
attempted is an important factor to be considered. Under a particular
set of facts a defendant might be convicted of an attempt to commit
arson, whereas one who has gone correspondingly as far toward committing murder might not be convicted. It is logical that a different
result might be reached, as the crimes of attempted arson and attempted murder are as different as the crimes of arson and murder
themselves.
An illustration of this can be had by comparing the cases of
State v. Davis and Commonwealth v. Peaslee,' the former a prosecution
IBroadhead v State, 24 Ala. App. 576, 139 So. 115 (1932), Milner
v State, 18 Ala. App. 157, 89 So. 306 (1921) People v Anderson, 1
Cal. App. (2d) 687, 37 P (2d) 67 (1934), People v Gilbert, 86 Cal.
App. 8, 260 Pac. 558 (1927) People v Lanzit, 70 Cal. App. 498, 233
Pac. 816 (1925), West v Commonwealth, 156 Va. 975, 157 S. E. 538
(1931)
Compare McDowell v State, 19 Ala. App. 532, 98 So. 701 (1924)
Gustine v State, 86 Fla. 24, 97 So. 207 (1923), Coffee v State, 39 Ga.
App. 664, 148 S. E. 303 (1929), and Dill v State, 149 Miss. 167, 115
So. 203 (1928) with People v. Lombard, 131 Cal. App. 525, 21 P (2d)
94 (1933), Hammond v State, 47 Ga. App. 795, 171 S. E. 559 (1933),
Cunningham v State, 48 Miss. 685 (1874), and State v Thomason,
23 Okla. Cr. 104, 212 Pac. 1026 (1923)
'219 Mo. 1222, 6 S. W (2d) 609 (1928)
177 Mass. 267, 59 N. E. 55 (1901)
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for attempted murder and the latter a prosecution for attempted arson.
In the case of State v. Davis, the defendant hired another to kill an
enemy He planned the method to be followed, furnished the killer
with a picture by which he could identify the victim, and made
arrangements with the victim's wife to get the victim to the place
where he was to be killed. The failure of the hireling to carry out
the plan was the only thing that prevented the crime from being consummated. The court ruled that the defendant had committed no
overt act, and that no attempt had been committed. Compare the facts
of this case with those of Commonwealth v. Peaslee, in which an
opposite result was reached. In this case the defendant arranged
combustible material in a building in such a way that it could be set
on fire by a candle placed in a pan of turpentine. He attempted to
induce another to go into the building, place the candle in position,
and light it. The other refused. It was held that an attempt to commit
arson had been committed, and that the acts of the defendant were
sufficient to constitute an overt act. What facts existed in the Peaslee
case, but not in the Davis case. which caused one court to hold that
an attempt had been committed, while the other court reversed a
conviction for attempt? In the Davis case, the defendant had completed all the steps necessary to carrying out his plan. All that
remained to be done was the actual killing. The defendant in the
Peaslee case did no more than this. The reason for the different results
is not in the difference in the acts. The only material difference is
in the crimes themselves. The inference to be gathered is that in
proving an attempt to commit arson, it is not necessary to show acts
coming as close to actual commission as is necessary in a prosecution
for attempted murder2
In the case of Commonwealth v. Kennedy,' Justice Holmes makes
a similar suggestion in regard to the remoteness of the act of the
defendant from the actual consummation of the crime. Holmes suggests that the gravity of the crime is a controlling factor, and that acts
which are more remote from actual consummation might constitute
an attempt to commit serious crime, while an attempt to commit a
lesser crime will require a closer proximity to consummation. He
suggests, further, that convictions of attempts to commit crimes that
are greatly feared will be sustained upon proof of acts which are
comparatively remote from actual consummation.
Another important factor to be considered in borderline cases is
the matter of proof of specific intent. Specific intent must be shown
before an attempt can be made out. Where intent can be shown from
-See Hicks v Commonwealth, 86 Va. 223, 9 S. E. 1024, 19 Am.
St. Rep. 891 (1889), Manner v State, 43 Ga. App. 772, 159 S. E. 902
(1931)
170 Mass. 18,48 N. E. 770 (1897).
Miller v State, 130 Miss. 730, 95 So. 83 (1923), Merritt v Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 180 S. E. 395 (1935) Thacker v Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S. E. 504 (1922), State v Cass, 146 Wash. 585,
264 Pac. 7 (1928).
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some source other than defendant's acts, the question of proof of
intent is not Important for our discussion here. But where intent must
be shown by inference from the acts of the defendant, the question
of proof of intent will in some cases be very material. Here the acts
of the defendant must serve two functions; they must fulfill the requirement of an overt act and must also be so unequivocal that intent
can be inferred from them. Of these two functions the latter will in
most cases be the more difficult to fill. If the defendant has done acts
which definitely show that he has the specific intent to commit a
crime, such acts are almost always done not in mere preparation, but
in the actual commission of the crime itself. Such acts will fulfill the
requirement of an overt act as well -as prove intent. However, the
converse of this proposition is not necessarily true. Acts which will
meet the overt act requirement will not necessarily be acts from which
specific intent can be inferred.
On this point see State v. Cass' and Jones v. State,9 two cases with
similar facts which reach different results. Both are prosecutions for
attempted burglary In the Cass case the defendant went to the door
of an apartment and rattled the doorknob. In the Jones case, the
defendant went onto the porch of a dwelling house and rattled a
window The acts in one case seem to have gone no farther toward
consummation of the crime of burglary than the acts in the other. The
difference is that in the Cass case it was shown from the fact that the
defendant had burglar's tools m his possession that he had the intent
to commit the crime of burglary while in the Jones case there was
nothing except the defendant's act in rattling the window from which
intent could be inferred. It seems likely that if specific intent had been
shown in the Jones case from evidence other than the acts of the
defendant, a conviction would have been sustained.
This tendency of the courts in a close case to take into consideration other factors in determining whether there is an overt act which
is sufficient to sustain a conviction accounts for much of the confusion
which exists today in the law of attempts. A court cannot look at
the defendant's acts alone and say whether an attempt has been committed. It must take into consideration all of the circumstances
surrounding the crime. The act must be considered in the light of the
nature of the crime, the proof of specific intent, and perhaps other
factors which might enter into individual cases. As long as this is so,
different courts will disagree as to what acts constitute an attempt.
No single rule can be set up which will determine in all case whether
or not an attempt has been made. Of course, in the majority of cases
the act itself will be so clearly an overt act or no overt act that it
alone will be the determining factor. But in the borderline cases,
those that give the courts the most trouble, the act must be considered
146 Wash. 585, 264 Pac. 7 (1928)
172 Miss. 597, 161 So. 143 (1935)
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an the light of all the circumstances surrounding the crime in order
to determine whether or not it is an overt act.
JOHN J. YEAGEIr

THE OVERT ACT IN CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS
Webster defines an attempt as an undertaking or an unsuccessful effort.' This definition implies first, an intention to do some particular act; second, an act or acts which are calculated to effect a
realization of this intention; and third, a failure to accomplish the
intended act. The word attempt, as used to designate a branch of
criminal law, has the same meaning as when used in ordinary speech.
Thus, a criminal attempt requires specific intent to commit a crime,
an overt act moving directly toward the commission of the crime, and
a failure to consummate the crime. The problem to be considered
here is the nature of the required overt act.
That there must be some overt act leading directly toward the
commission of the intended crime is not questioned. While specific
intent is a necessary, and perhaps the most important, element to be
proved in a prosecution for criminal attempts, proof of intent alone
does not make out a crime2 But specific intent must of necessity
often be proved from the acts of the accused, and in many cases it
cannot be inferred from any acts except those moving directly toward
consummation of the crime. This seems to have given rise to an
erroneous assumption that wherever intent can be shown from the
'acts of the accused, an attempt has been committed, and courts have
at times sustained a conviction where intent was shown from mere
preparation. In the case of People v. Lombard' it was shown that the
defendants intended to kidnap someone. They prepared a place to
hide the victim, procured ropes and gags, and drove out to the victim's
'home. One of the defendants scouted around and found that the
police were watching the house. The defendants made no move toward
actually kidnapping anyone; however, the court held that these
preparations were enough to constitute an attempt. A similar holding
is found in Cunningham v. State, in which the court held that possession of blank -warrants of the state, seals, and a stamp of the state
'Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1935).
'Broadhead v State, 24 Ala. App. 576, 139 So. 115 (1932), Tharpe
v State, 23 Ala. App. 193, 122 So. 698 (1929) Miller v. State, 130
Miss. 730, 95 So. 83 (1923) Meritt v Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653,
180 S.E. 395 (1935), West v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 975, 157 S.E.
538 (1931), Thacker v Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S.E. 504
(1922)
3'McDowell v State, 19 Ala. App. 532, 98 So. 701 (1924), Coffee
v. State, 39 Ga. App. 664, 148 S.E. 303 (1929), Dill v State, 149 Miss.
.167, 115 So. 203 (1928), State v. Addor, 183 N.C. 687, 110 S.E. 650,
22 A.L.R. 219 (1922)- Lovett v. State, 19 Tex. 174 (1857)
' 131 Cal. App. 525, 21 P (2d) 94 (1933).
'49 Miss. 685 (1874).

